Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 31

Issue 2

Article 3

2019

Connecting the Dots: Quality, Antitrust, and Medicine
Theodosia Stavroulaki

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Theodosia Stavroulaki Connecting the Dots: Quality, Antitrust, and Medicine, 31 Loy. Consumer L. Rev.
175 (2019).
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol31/iss2/3

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information,
please contact law-library@luc.edu.

CONNECTING THE DOTS: QUALITY,
ANTITRUST, AND MEDICINE
Theodosia Stavroulaki 1*
Antitrust applies to healthcare. Questioning the wisdom of
this universal truth, medical professionals actively insisted and
still insist on professional discretion, self-regulations and other
practices that violate the antitrust laws. What do medical
professionals aim to achieve by resisting the application of
antitrust into their profession? What do antitrust enforcers aim to
achieve by applying antitrust law to the medical profession? The
answer is simple. Among others, both antitrust enforcers and
medical professionals aim to ensure quality. Interestingly, albeit
their goal is identical, their approach is different. Why? This
essay explores this enigma by analyzing some seminal healthcare
antitrust cases. It concludes that the U.S. antitrust enforcers by
remaining faithful to the narrative that, the more the available
choices, the better the quality, miss a crucial point: that the
quality of medical treatment also depends on non-economic
values such as the notions of safety and trust, essential features of
the therapeutic enterprise. This essay proposes that the antitrust
enforcers should extend the notion of healthcare quality when
they apply antitrust law in the healthcare sector so that this
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Nicholas Bagley as well as the participants in the 2017 Michigan Junior
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notion encompasses the multiple facets of healthcare quality and
the ethical values the doctor - patient relationship crucially
depends on. Adopting an alternative, less myopic, approach
would allow the antitrust enforcers to create an analytical
framework under which the multiple dimensions of healthcare
quality could be balanced against harm to competition. More
importantly, it would ensure that antitrust enforcers and medical
associations do not continuously struggle to impose their own
views on what the prevailing facets of healthcare quality should
be. In Donabedian’s language, an alternative approach would
ensure that all functions of the health system commit to the
quality goals that the system as a whole pursues.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................176
DIVING INTO THE HEART OF THE DEBATE:
PROFESSIONALISM v. ANTITRUST ..........................180
FROM GOLDFARB TO TELADOC: HOW DO THE U.S.
ANTITRUST ENFORCERS AND THE COURTS
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HEALTHCARE
QUALITY? ..........................................................................183
A. Protecting Healthcare Quality by Excluding
Antitrust: Quality as Professionalism ..........................183
B. Quality as a Public Safety Claim ...................................189
C. Protecting Quality by Correcting the Market
Imperfections .................................................................201
UNRAVELLING ARIADNE’S THREAD: HOW DO THE
U.S. ANTITRUST ENFORCERS AND THE
COURTS BALANCE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
DIFFERENT QUALITY PERSPECTIVES? ................208
A. Identifying the Core of the FTC’s and the U.S.
Courts’ Approach ..........................................................209
B. What are the Main Pros and Cons of the FTC’s and
the U.S. Courts’ Approach?..........................................214
CONCLUSION .............................................................................224

INTRODUCTION
Courts and law makers once believed that healthcare
markets should escape antitrust scrutiny. 2 The Supreme Court
2
David A. Hyman et al., Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition,
A REPORT BY THE FED.TRADE COMM’N AND THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1, 33
(July
2004),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-
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applied the antitrust rules to the activities of the American
Medical Association (AMA). 3 Nonetheless, the Court had not
specifically decided whether physicians’ activity constituted
‘trade’ on the basis of the Sherman Act leaving the question of
whether, and the extent to which, traditional antitrust rules
applied fully to physicians’ practice unexamined. 4 In general, it
was widely believed and accepted that the ‘learned professions’
exception applied to the antitrust principles. 5
Nonetheless, following the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 6 the strong belief that the
‘learned professions’ were not engaged in a commercial activity
and hence were not subject to Section 1 of the Sherman Act was
rejected. 7 The Goldfarb opinion made clear that learned
professions are not immune from the antitrust rules. The opinion,
though, did not clarify whether special treatment of the ‘learned
professions’ under the antitrust laws was totally precluded. In its
legendary footnote 17, the Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession, as
distinguished from a business, is, of course, relevant in
determining whether that particular restraint violates
the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the
practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the
professions antitrust concepts which originated in other
areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in another context be treated differently.
We intimate no view on any other situation than the one
with which we are confronted today. 8

Goldfarb, “marked a crucial watershed in American

health policy”. 9 Before the Court ruled, two underlying ideas
caredosecompetition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-departmentjustice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf.
3
4
5

Id.
Id. at n.161.
Id.

Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975).
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 587 (West Academic
Publishing, 7th ed. 2013).
8
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-89.
9
Clark C. Havighurst, Healthcare as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust
Response, 26 DUKE UNIV. J. HEALTH POL’Y & L. 939, 942 (2001).
6
7
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dominated healthcare delivery. First, markets fail in healthcare
and therefore ordinary market competition is either inappropriate
or unachievable in this sector. 10 Second, the medical profession is
a self-regulating profession appropriately invested with
substantial market power in the healthcare sector. 11 After the
Court spoke, however, medical associations were no longer free to
regulate either themselves or others in ways that restrained
‘trade’ in the language of the Sherman Act. 12 Instead, in the postGoldfarb era, physicians were actively prohibited from
establishing any form of alliance or cooperation that run afoul the
antitrust principles. In line with this new approach, one year after
Goldfarb, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 13 the
Supreme Court underlined that healthcare industry does not
deserve special treatment and therefore is fully subject to the
antitrust principles. 14
The application of antitrust law upon healthcare has
encountered strong resistance from medical professionals. In fact,
a number of cases in the post-Goldfarb era reveal that medical
professionals actively insisted on professional discretion, freedom
from lay interference, self-regulating activities, and other
practices that inevitably breach the antitrust principles. 15
Essentially, their fear is that antitrust rules and enforcement,
being tailored to apply to commodities, may disregard the special
facets and characteristics of the therapeutic enterprise, mainly the
healthcare quality concern and the medical profession’s selfregulatory duties. 16
Antitrust scholarship provides several reasons why the
application of the antitrust rules in the healthcare marketplace
have not prevented physicians’ from engaging in anticompetitive
activity. These are mainly under enforcement and lack of
certainty as to the legal rules governing all forms of physicians’
alliances and collaborations. 17 Exploring this puzzle again, this
essay asks: What do medical professionals aim to achieve by
resisting the application of antitrust into their profession? What
10
11
12

Id.
Id.
Id.

Arizona v. Maricopa Cty Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982).
Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 34.
15
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 586.
16
Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Enforcement in the Medical Services
Industry: What Does It All Mean? 58 MILBANK MEM’L FUND QUARTERLY
89, 92 (1980).
17
Thomas L. Greaney, Thirty Years of Solitude: Antitrust Law and
Physician Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189, 195. (2007).
13
14
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do antitrust enforcers aim to achieve by insisting that antitrust
law should apply to the medical profession? The answer is
simple. Among others, both antitrust enforcers and medical
professionals aim to ensure quality of care. Interestingly, albeit
their goal is identical, their approach is different? Why?
Primarily, for two reasons. First, medical professionals
and antitrust enforcers do not see quality through the same lens.
While antitrust enforcers remain faithful to the dogma that
quality will be the result of the economic process, medical
professionals mainly believe that the medical process and not the
competitive rivalry will lead to quality improvements. 18 From an
antitrust perspective, quality is considered to be the outcome of
the competitive process in which consumers enjoy choices and
producers have incentives to enhance the quality of the products
and services they offer in order to increase their sales and
therefore their profits. 19 From medical professionals’ perspective,
“quality is effectively binary[;]” either excellent care is offered to a
specific individual or it isn’t. 20 Additionally, while medical
professionals consider that health outcomes are improved
through the attributes of professionalism, such as altruism,
respect, and the notion of trust in the doctor-patient relationship,
antitrust authorities mainly believe that vigorous competition and
not professionalism ensure health improvements. This difference
in opinion inevitably leads to disagreement on how quality of
care is improved, with both antitrust enforcers and medical
professionals supporting their positions in the name of quality. 21
Accommodating plausible professional concerns in a
competitive market ranks among the most difficult tasks for
antitrust. 22 Surely, some quality claims can easily be condemned
and judged by antitrust as they amount to nothing more than
naked restraints to competition. As Robert Pitofsky famously
noted, quality-of-care justifications “have been advanced to
support, among other things, broad restraints on almost any form
of price competition, policies that inhibited the development of
managed care organizations, and concerted refusals to deal with
providers or organizations that represented a competitive threat

18
Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Healthcare Quality and
the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 556 (2002).
19
Thomas E. Kauper, The Role Of Quality Healthcare Consideration In
Antitrust, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., 273, 293 (1998).
20
Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 11.
21
See Hammer & Sage, supra note 18, at 557.
22
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 587.
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to physicians.” 23 Other claims are obviously more difficult to
examine and assess. These include claims, that due to the
healthcare markets’ economic facets, consumers cannot easily
assess the quality level of the services they receive and, therefore,
are vulnerable to exploitation by insensitive providers. Arguably,
such claims often necessitate closer examination by antitrust
authorities. 24 To a certain extent these claims serve a clear
purpose: they prevent medical professionals from taking
advantage of their patients’ vulnerability, ignorance, and lack of
expertise. 25 Since opportunistic behavior by physicians harms
patients’ trust in their physicians and generates anxieties harmful
to the medical enterprise, there is good reason to consider
whether a principled basis in competition law for deeming such
claims compatible with a competitive regime is necessary. 26 Is this
an easy task? Obviously, the answer is a strong no. Nonetheless,
this is not sufficient to justify antitrust enforcers’ unexamined
and unconditional rejection of medical associations’ healthcare
quality claims.
This essay is structured as follows: First, to set the stage,
Part I identifies the heart of the conflict. It explains the main
reasons why medical markets are considered special, and explores
how medical professionals assess and define quality. Part II,
raises the questions that are at the heart of this article. It asks:
what are the main concerns and justifications medical
associations and physicians raise with an eye to protect quality?
How do the antitrust enforcers respond to these claims? Under
what techniques do they value them? Do they manage to reach
the appropriate balance between the protection of competition
and the multiple dimensions of healthcare quality? In unravelling
Ariadne’s thread, this article analyzes a few seminal antitrust
cases where healthcare quality claims were actually addressed
and examined. A short conclusion follows.

DIVING INTO THE HEART OF THE DEBATE:

PROFESSIONALISM V. ANTITRUST

The healthcare policy debate is dominated by different
ways of thinking about medical treatment—about different

23
24
25
26

Hyman et al., supra note 2, at 28.
See Havighurst, supra note 9, at 946.
Id. at 947.

Id.
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paradigms.27 Advocates of the traditional professional paradigm
insist that market forces do not function well in medical care, and
therefore medical care should be insulated from market forces, at
least in certain cases. 28 Medical treatment involves technical
decisions that patients are unable to make. 29 Medical
professionals with specialized knowledge and scientific expertise
should be entrusted with medical care decision making because of
the asymmetry information problem—providers can judge the
quality of the services they offer, consumers cannot. 30
Physicians and medical associations animated by this
belief often consider themselves the guardians of healthcare
quality. Inspired by their commitment to professionalism, they
feel entitled to intervene in the healthcare markets they operate to
correct the asymmetric distribution of information between
patients and doctors, and secure quality. These interventions
usually take the form of ethical norms restricting the forms of
advertising that can actually take place in a market pervaded by
information asymmetries, 31 standards and certification
arrangements, price setting for physicians’ fees, and occupational
licensing and other forms of self-regulation. Inevitably, these
practices and norms often catch the attention of antitrust law
which generally assumes that consumers are better off if
competitor’s independence is preserved.
To fully understand and assess medical associations’
claims that self-regulation may in fact correct the asymmetry of
information pervading medical markets and ensure quality, one
should first consider what a free healthcare market would
actually look like. Proponents of occupational licensing warn that
a free market may fail to efficiently allocate professional services
to consumers due to the extremely low quality of services
provided without licensing.32 The asymmetric distribution of
information between professionals and consumers as to the
quality of the services they receive would inevitably cause the
27
James F. Blumstein, The Application of the Antitrust Doctrine to the
Healthcare Industry: The Interweaving of Empirical and Normative Issues, 31

INDIANA L. REV. 1, 91 (1998).
28
Id.
29
30

Id.
Id.

Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures,
Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98
MICH. L. REV. 849, 871 (2000).
32
Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels By Another Name: Should
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV., 1093, 1115
31

(2014).
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‘lemons problem’: 33 if consumers cannot identify and assess
quality, they may choose to pay only for average quality. 34 If
consumers are unable to recognize superior quality they are
unwilling to pay a premium; therefore, providers may be
unwilling to undertake the higher costs the provision of aboveaverage quality services may entail. 35 Ultimately, the quality of
professional services will be substantially reduced. This would
result in “deadweight loss” 36 in the form of all market transactions
that did not take place “between high quality providers and highquality demanding consumers.”37 Occupational licensing reduces
this risk by ensuring that only qualified individuals that conform
to minimum levels of quality can offer their services to
consumers. 38 In antitrust parlance, licensing establishes an entry
barrier against incompetent and unqualified practitioners.
Medical markets are also pervaded by negative
externalities. An individual may choose to purchase low quality
services for a low price rather than no service at all, only because
she does not fully internalize the costs of poor service. 39 Licensing
or other means of self-regulation enhance public safety by
imposing minimum quality standards on professional providers.40
If the story ended here it would be incomplete. Licensing
is costly and can therefore lead to an increase in service prices. 41
Some consumers may be deterred from buying professional
services, namely the services that they would be able to buy in a
world without licensing. 42 Some would-be practitioners would be
harmed too; these are the non-qualified individuals that would be
willing to compete with the qualified ones by offering cheaper
Id.; see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON., 488, 489 (1970).
34
Marina Lao, Comment: The Rule of Reason and Horizontal Restraints
Involving Professionals, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 499, 513 (2000).
35
Id.
33

In general “Deadweight loss is the loss of consumer and producer
surplus when output declines from the competitive to the monopoly level; it is
the most common measure of the social cost of monopoly.” Richard A. Posner,
William M. Landes, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937,
954 (1980).
37
See Edlin & Haw, supra note 32, at 1116.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Edlin & Haw, supra note 32, at 1116 (citing MORRIS M. KLEINER,
Licensing OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING
COMPETITION 65-96 (2006)).
42
See Edlin & Haw, supra note. 32, at 1114-15.
36
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services. 43 In sum, self-regulation and professional licensing limit
the deadweight loss linked with the lemons problem and negative
externalities but at the same time also result in deadweight loss
by restraining competition. 44
The remedy, though, should not be worse than the disease.
Therefore, if competition authorities have to decide whether a
specific form of self-regulation or professional licensure is pro- or
anti- competitive, they should be required to weigh harm to
competition against quality improvements. Do the U.S. antitrust
enforcers perform this task? And, if yes, how? By examining
medical associations’ quality claims and justifications in a
number of seminal healthcare antitrust cases, the following
section is dedicated to answering these questions.

FROM GOLDFARB TO TELADOC: HOW DO THE
U.S. ANTITRUST ENFORCERS AND THE
COURTS TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
HEALTHCARE QUALITY?
A. Protecting Healthcare Quality by Excluding Antitrust: Quality
as Professionalism
State Boards active in the field of healthcare often invoke
that their anticompetitive actions aimed at protecting public
safety and health are immune from antitrust law on the basis of
the state action doctrine. The latter articulates that “antitrust
laws do not apply to anticompetitive restraints imposed by the
States as an act of government”. 45 The Supreme Court introduced
this doctrine in Parker 46, after acknowledging that “nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history suggests that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature”. 47 The Court underlined that
a state cannot “give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it or by declaring that their
action is lawful”. 48 The Court identified three situations in which
defendants may claim that they should not be subject to antitrust
43
44

Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1116.

The N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 366 (4th
Cir. 2013).
46
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
47
The N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 366.
48
Id.
45
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rules as the state action doctrine applies. 49 First, if “a state’s own
actions ‘ipso facto are exempt’ from the antitrust laws”. 50 Second,
when private entities “act on the basis of a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy and their behavior is
actively supervised by the State itself”. 51 Third, “when
municipalities or other sub state governmental entities act
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or
monopoly public service”. 52
In general, U.S. courts have taken the view that “given the
fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic
competition that are embodied in the federal antitrust laws, state
action immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by
implication”. 53 Thus, they recognize “state action immunity” only
in cases where it is clear that the anticompetitive behavior under
scrutiny is undertaken on the basis of regulatory regime that “is
the State’s own”. 54 When examining the state action doctrine in
healthcare cases, the FTC and the U.S. courts do not seem willing
to abstain from the Parker doctrine as the courts in North

Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, South Carolina State
Board of Dentistry, and Teladoc cases clearly demonstrate.
In the South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, the FTC

examined whether the State Board of Dentistry in South Carolina
breached the antitrust principles by introducing a regulation that
contravened legislation aiming to facilitate access to dental care
for poor children in South Carolina.55 In the early 1990s, only a
limited percentage of Medicaid-eligible children received
preventive dental care. 56 To address this problem, the South
Carolina legislature amended the applicable framework to allow
dental hygienists to offer preventive dental care to students. 57 The
amended legislation, however, foresaw that students should be
examined by a dentist before the hygienist offers them dental
care. Therefore, access to preventive dental care in schools

49
50
51
52
53
54

Id.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id.
Id.

South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, Docket No. 9311, 1 (Fed.
Trade
Comm’n
Sept.
11,
2007)
(opinion
and
order),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2004/07/040728commis
sionopinion.pdf.
56
Id.
57
Id.
55
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remained limited. 58 In 2000, the state legislature again amended
its regulatory framework to facilitate the provision of preventive
dental care in schools. 59 Shortly after these amendments took
place, the Board introduced a new regulation that reinforced the
pre-examination condition. 60 Consequently, even a lower
percentage of poor children in South Carolina received
preventive dental care. In 2003, the South Carolina legislature
amended the law again in order to clarify that the preexamination condition did not apply in cases where hygienists
offered their services in public health settings. 61 In response to
this amendment, the Board reclaimed its initial position that all
students should be examined by dentist before a hygienist offers
them services. 62
As expected, the FTC initiated antitrust proceedings
against the Board. 63 In defending the challenged policy, the
Board asserted that considering its status as a state agency, its
actions are those of the State and were therefore covered by the
state action doctrine. 64 It further asserted that “it acted pursuant
to a ‘clearly articulated’ state policy to displace competition”. 65
The FTC rejected this antitrust defense. In unfolding its
legal thinking, the FTC explained that “where the actor is . . . a
political subdivision of a state or a private party ostensibly acting
pursuant to state authorization, the Court has applied a more
rigorous analysis to determine whether the entity is excluded
from the federal antitrust laws.” In such cases, the FTC stated,
“the party is not ipso facto entitled to state action protection;
rather, the party must demonstrate that it acted pursuant to a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to
displace competition in favor of regulation and that the state
actively supervised the actions.” 66 Such non-governmental entities
lack the political accountability to shape competition policy. 67
Refusing to treat them as equivalent to the state was therefore in
line with the state action test. 68 The FTC further stressed that
“[c]ourts have consistently declined to afford ipso facto state
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18.
Id.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

186

Vol. 31:2

action status to state licensing or regulatory boards that are
composed at least in part of members of the regulated industry”. 69
In this light, the challenged regulation was “in direct conflict with
the South Carolina statute and inconsistent with the policy ideals
behind the state action doctrine: that federalism permits the state
as sovereign to displace the national policy of open competition
with regulation, only if such anticompetitive intent is clearly
shown”.70 The FTC concluded, therefore, that the conditions of
the state action test were not met. 71
In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the
case centered around the strategy of the Board to bar non-dentists
from offering teeth whitening services in North Carolina. 72 In the
early 1990s, only dentists provided teeth whitening services in
North Carolina; in 2003, however, non-licensed individuals
started providing these services at mall kiosks, spas, and retail
stores. 73 The non-dentists’ services differed from dentists’ teeth
whitening services in certain facets such as the immediacy of the
results, the ease of use, and price. 74 On the other hand, the inoffice teeth whitening services offered by qualified dentists were
faster, more effective, and did not necessitate repeated sessions. 75
Shortly thereafter, dentists expressed their concerns
regarding the quality of the services to the Board. 76 The Board
initiated formal proceedings, relying on North Carolina’s Dental
Practice Act (the Act) to prevent non-dentists from providing
these services. The Act stated that “it is unlawful for an
individual to practice dentistry in North Carolina without a
license from the Board”. 77 Although the Board did not have any
power to prevent non–licensed providers from violating the
Dental Practice Act, 78 they sent numerous cease-and-desist letters
69
70
71

Id. at 18.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-29.

North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Docket No 9343, 1 (Fed.
Trade Comm’n June 4, 2013) (Opinion by Commissioner Rosch),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/12/111207ncdenta
lopinion.pdf.
73
Id.
74
The N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 364.
72

75
76
77

Id.
Id.
Id.

78
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Docket No 9343, 1, 3 (Fed.
Trade Comm’n Dec. 7, 2011) (Opinion by Commissioner Rosch),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/12/111207ncdenta
lopinion.pdf.
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to non-dentists providing teeth-whitening services. 79 The Board
also sent letters to mall operators to prevent them from leasing
kiosk spaces to non–qualified teeth whiteners. 80 Undoubtedly, the
Board’s expelling strategy was successful. 81 Non-licensed
individuals started refraining from offering teeth whitening
services in North Carolina and producers of teeth whitening
products used by non-dentists soon exited the market in the
state. 82
Unsurprisingly, the FTC initiated antitrust proceedings
against the Board. Alleging that the Board’s actions prevented
non-dentists from offering teeth whitening services in North
Carolina and therefore deprived consumers of lower prices and
choice, the FTC found the challenged conduct anticompetitive. 83
In defending its strategy, the Board alleged that it was
covered by the state action doctrine. 84 To be exempted from the
antitrust rules, the Board claimed, its conduct should only meet
the first condition of the state action test, “that the challenged
restraint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy.” 85 The Board further claimed that even
if it was subject to the second condition of the state action
doctrine, that its activity must be actively supervised by the State,
North Carolina’s “structural legal oversight of the Board” was
sufficient to satisfy that condition.86
The FTC claimed that the Board failed to prove the active
supervision requirement, and rejected the Board’s defense. 87 The
U.S. antitrust enforcers clarified that the Court always applied
antitrust law to public-private hybrid entities, such as regulatory
bodies consisting of market participants.88 If these entities were
not subject to the active supervision requirement, the FTC
claimed, they may act according to their own interests rather than

79
80
81
82

Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
The N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 365
Id.

North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Docket No 9343, supra
note at 78 at 6.
84
North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Docket No 9343, 1, 8 (Fed.
Trade Comm’n Feb. 8, 2011) (Opinion by Commissioner Kovacic),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/02/110208commo
pinion.pdf.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 8-11.
88
Id. at 9.
83
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the governmental interests of the State. 89 Requiring active
supervision by the state itself in cases where the state agency
financially benefits from the anticompetitive restraint is in line
with the policies underlying the state action doctrine. 90 The North
Carolina Board was controlled by licensed dentists in North
Carolina, thus market participants motivated by their selfinterest that were elected directly by their colleagues. 91
Consequently, the FTC alleged that the defendant could escape
from the antitrust mandate only in case its conduct was actively
supervised by the state. 92
Before the Fourth Circuit the defendant again raised the
state action defense. The Court did not divert from the FTC’s
legal analysis.93 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower’s court
decision. It also outlined the conditions under which the active
supervision condition is generally met. 94 First, the Court clarified
that the supervisor must review the substance of the
anticompetitive decision and not only the procedure under which
the decision was adopted. 95 Second, the Court clarified that the
supervisor must not be an active market participant. 96
Concluding that the defendant failed to satisfy the necessary
conditions of the state action test, the Court rejected this antitrust
defense. 97
The state action defense was also raised by the Texas
Medical Board, a state agency “statutorily empowered to regulate
the practice of medicine in Texas”. 98 The latter concerned the
antitrust proceedings brought by Teladoc, a telemedicine
company, against the Board over a rule 99 that prohibited
“prescription of any dangerous drug or controlled substance
without first establishing a defined physician-patient
relationship”. This mainly included a physical examination that
should be performed ‘“by either face-to-face visit or in-person
evaluation’ elsewhere defined as requiring the provider and
89
90
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patient to be in the same physical location or medical site.” 100
Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged that the rule in question
restricted competition by limiting price competition, restricting
access and by restricting the overall supply of medical services. 101
The Texas Medical Board argued that the challenged rule
is not subject to the antitrust rules because the state action
doctrine applied.102 The Board claimed that it was actively
supervised by the state as its decisions were subject to “judicial
review by the courts of Texas and the State Office of
Administrative Hearings as well as review by the Texas
Legislature”. 103 Noting, though, that the judicial review on which
the Board relied was rather limited, the court alleged that the
Supreme Court’s state action test was not met 104

B. Quality as a Public Safety Claim
The Supreme Court initially dealt with quality claims
related to the learned professions in 1978, when the U.S. initiated
antitrust proceedings against the National Society of Professional
Engineers. The plaintiff claimed that the National Society of
Professional Engineers’ Code of Ethics prevented “its members
from submitting competitive bids for engineering services[,]” 105
and therefore violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 106 Relying
on footnote 17 of the Goldfarb decision, the defendant claimed
that its ethical norms served clearly a public safety purpose: they
minimized the risk “that competition would produce inferior
engineering work endangering the public safety”. 107 The District
Court rejected this justification without delving into the question
of whether competition had actually harmed public safety or
welfare. 108 To the Court, this inquiry was not necessary. 109 The
District Court easily dismissed the defendant’s public safety
100
101
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LEXIS 166754, at *17 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2015).
103
Id. at 21-22.
104
Id. at 22-23.
105
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
United States v. Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Engineers, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460
(D.D.C. 1975), aff’d in part, modified in part, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir.
1977), aff’d, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), and opinion withdrawn and superseded, No.
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claim, taking the view that “the ban clearly imped[ed] the
ordinary give and take of the market place and operat[ed] on its
face [as] tampering with the price structure of engineering fee”. 110
The lower court’s view was affirmed both by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court. 111 In rejecting the defendant’s
antitrust defense, the Supreme Court grasped the opportunity to
clarify to what extent under U.S. antitrust law safety concerns
can be assessed under the rule of reason. 112 The Court stated that
an antitrust legal analysis can be conducted under two
complementary categories. 113 The first includes agreements, that
due to their nature and necessary effects, are so obviously
anticompetitive that they can be found illegal without extensive
examination of the industry 114; these “are per se illegal”. 115 The
second category includes agreements whose effect on competition
can be evaluated only if the facts peculiar to the business and the
reasons why the restraint under scrutiny was imposed are
assessed. 116 In both cases, the Court held, the purpose of the
analysis is to assess the impact of the restraint on competition and
“not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the
public interest”. 117
The Court stated that “ethical norms may serve to regulate
and promote competition in professional services, and thus fall
within the rule of reason”. 118 It underlined that in this particular
case, the defendant’s quality claim was “a far cry from such a
position”.119 The Court acknowledged that competition may in
fact cause some providers to sell a defective product. 120 In this
light, the Court stated “competitive bidding for engineering
projects may be inherently imprecise and incapable of taking into
account all the variables that are involved in the actual
performance of the project”. 121 Therefore,
a purchaser might conclude that his interest in quality—
which may embrace the safety of the end product—
110
111
112
113
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outweighs the advantages of achieving cost savings by
pitting one competitor against another. Or an individual
vendor might independently refrain from price
negotiation until he has satisfied himself that he fully
understands the scope of his customers’ needs. 122
The Court admitted that such decisions may make
sense. 123 Such justifications, however, “cannot satisfy the rule of
reason”. 124
The Court noted an alternative approach would amount
“to nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the
Sherman Act”. 125 It underlined that the Sherman Act reflects the
notion that competition will lead not only to lower prices but also
to higher quality goods and services.126 In rejecting the
defendant’s defense, the Court contended that “the statutory
policy precludes inquiry into the question of whether competition
is good or bad”.127 Therefore, any claim that is based on the
rationale that competition is too intense cannot be analyzed under
the rule of reason. 128 Adopting a different approach, the Court
explained, would undoubtedly create the “sea of doubt”. 129
The Supreme Court dealt with analogous quality concerns
and claims in the seminal case, FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists. 130 The Supreme Court examined the question of
whether the FTC correctly assessed that “a conspiracy among
dentists to refuse to submit x-rays to dental insurers for use in
benefits determinations” constituted an antitrust violation. 131
Since the 1970s, dental health insurers, in response to the
demands of their policyholders, initiated efforts to suppress the
cost of dental treatment by “limiting payment of benefits to the
cost of the least expensive yet adequate treatment suitable to the
needs of individual patients”. 132 In applying such costcontainment measures, known as “alternative benefits” plans,
insurers were required to evaluate the diagnosis and
recommendation of the treating dentist, either in advance or
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
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130
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following the dental treatment. 133 In carrying out such evaluation,
insurers often asked dentists to submit, “along with insurance
claim forms requesting payment of benefits, any dental x-rays
that had been used by the dentist in examining the patient”.134
Typically, claim forms and accompanying x-rays were reviewed
by lay claims examiners who were entitled either to approve
payment of claims or to refer claims to dental consultants for
further review. 135 The dental consultants may recommend that
the insurer approve a claim, deny it, or pay only for a less
expensive course of treatment. 136
Such review of diagnostic and treatment decisions had
been viewed by some dentists as a threat to their autonomy and
economic welfare. 137 In this context, the Indiana Dental
Association, a professional association consisting of almost 85%
of dentists in the State of Indiana, initiated an aggressive effort to
prevent insurers from implementing alternative benefit plans “by
enlisting member dentists to pledge not to submit x-rays in
conjunction with claim forms”. 138 The Association’s efforts were
undoubtedly successful; numerous dentists signed the pledge, and
insurers operating in Indiana could not easily obtain compliance
with their requests for x-rays. 139 Insurers were forced either to
adopt more costly methods of making alternative benefits
determinations or to completely abandon such efforts. 140
The FTC initiated antitrust proceedings against the
Association. 141 In its complaint, the FTC alleged that the
Association’s strategy amounted to a conspiracy that unlawfully
restrained trade on the basis of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 142
“Absent such a restraint[,]” the FTC alleged, “competition among
dentists for patients would have tended to lead dentists to
compete with respect to their policies in dealing with patients’
insurers”.143 Hence, the FTC claimed that the Association’s policy
had the actual effect of “eliminating such competition among
dentists and preventing insurers from obtaining access to x-rays
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
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in the desired manner”. 144 The FTC held that these findings of
anticompetitive effect “were sufficient to establish that the
restraint was unreasonable, even absent proof that the
Association’s policy had resulted in higher costs to the insurers
and patients than would have occurred had the x-rays been
provided”. 145
The defendant raised a public safety defense that, not
surprisingly, did not alter FTC’s initial assessment. More
specifically, the FTC rejected the Association’s argument that its
ethical policy of withholding x-rays “was reasonable because the
provision of x-rays might lead the insurers to make inaccurate
determinations of the proper level of care, and thus injure the
health of the insured patients”. 146 They found no evidence that
use of x-rays by insurers would lead to inferior dental
treatment. 147
The Seventh Circuit fundamentally diverted from the
FTC’s findings. Accepting the defendant’s characterization of its
rule against submission of x-rays as merely an ethical and moral
policy designed to enhance the welfare of dental patients, it
concluded that the FTC’s findings were erroneous. 148 Applying a
rule of reason analysis, the court held that by deterring dentists
from joining together to promote standards of quality that are in
line with the American Dental Association’s Code of Professional
Conduct and the Indiana Dental Code, the FTC, “with absolutely
no expertise” in the field of dentistry, “unwisely regulates the
dental profession and all of its specialties”, and “to the detriment
of consumers”. 149 Underlining that “the group of dental health
care insurers should not be permitted to forsake standards of
quality and proper dental care in an attempt to decrease their
dental costs”, especially in this case where there were no actual
proof that the review of dental x-rays had actually decreased the
costs of care, the Seventh Circuit vacated the FTC’s ruling. 150
Before the Supreme Court, the defendant once again
raised a public safety defense. 151 In line with the FTC’s legal
analysis, the Supreme Court found that the defendant’s argument
144
145
146
147
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was “flawed both legally and factually”.152 Citing National
Society of Professional Engineers, the Court held that claiming
that an unrestrained market in which consumers are provided
with information will lead them to make dangerous or unsafe
choices amounts to “nothing less than a frontal assault on the
basic policy of the Sherman Act”. 153 The Court insisted that there
was no reason to believe that the provision of information in the
dental services market will harm consumers more than in other
markets. 154 The Supreme Court emphasized that the insurers that
determine the level of care to pay for are not the ones that receive
the dental services. 155 The Court, however, did not assess whether
this market failure might affect the quality of dental care.
Adopting the view that “insurers are themselves in competition
for the patronage of the patients”, the Court easily concluded that
insurers have the incentives to consider patients’ welfare. 156 In
making this assessment and without providing any essential
justification, the Court concluded that while insurers always
behave as their patients’ perfect agents, medical professionals
behave always as their patients’ imperfect ones.
Similar patient safety concerns were also raised by the
Dental Board in North Carolina, where the Board claimed that
its strategy against non-dentists aimed to protect public health
and patients’ welfare. 157 In brief, the Board held that if nondentists were permitted to offer teeth whitening services, the
quality of these services would be reduced. 158 The FTC
condemned defendant’s quality justification as non-cognizable. 159
“Cognizable is a justification”, the FTC explained, “that stems
from measures that increase output or improve product quality,
service or innovation”. 160 Alleging, however, that the Courts have
repeatedly rejected the notion that welfare and public safety
concerns constitute “cognizable justifications” the FTC dismissed
the defendant’s quality concerns. 161
152
153
154
155
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In defending its policy, the Board also alleged that “a valid
defense to a Sherman Act claim exists where a state agency
promotes public health and enforces state’s law even if the
conditions of the state action doctrine are not met”. 162 Adopting,
once again, the view that “a public safety defense is extraneous to
an analysis of competitive effects”, the FTC rejected the Board’s
public safety concerns. 163 Before reaching this conclusion though,
the FTC did not omit to examine the Board’s claim in substance.
To substantiate its health safety claim, the Board submitted four
anecdotal reports of harm. 164 The FTC held that “four anecdotal
reports of harm over a multi-year period based on products
considered safe by the FDA cannot be considered “adequate
evidence of a potential health or safety risk’”. 165 The FTC also
noted that “although several board members had identified a
number of theoretical risks from non-dentist teeth whitening,
none was able to cite any clinical or empirical evidence validating
any of these concerns.” 166 In light of this assessment, the FTC
found, again, the Board’s claim unsubstantiated.
The Fourth Circuit fully aligned with the FTC’s legal
reasoning. Interestingly, Circuit Judge Barbara Milano Keenan,
who concurred in the majority’s opinion, wrote separately “to
emphasize the narrow scope of the Appellate Court’s holding that
the Board is a private actor for the purposes of the state action
doctrine.” 167 Judge Keenan made clear her belief that the Board
was mainly incentivized by a desire to limit the provision of teeth
whitening services by non-dentists “under unsanitary
conditions.” 168 She also stressed that (a) the Board “was aware
that several consumers had suffered from adverse side effects,
including bleeding or chemically burned gums”, following
treatment by unqualified individuals;169 (b) several mall kiosks
where such teeth-whitening services took place did not even have
access to running water; 170 (c) the Board had received several
reports that non-dentists offered teeth whitening services
“without using gloves or masks, thereby increasing the risk of
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adverse side effects.” 171 In this light, Judge Keenan admitted that
the record was in line with the Board’s core quality claim that
“there is a safety risk inherent in allowing certain individuals who
are not licensed dentists” to offer teeth whitening services. 172 She
emphasized, however, that only North Carolina “is entitled to
make the legislative judgment” that the benefits of deterring nondentists from performing dental services surpass the harm to
competition, and not a private consortium. 173
The Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 174
the sole licensing authority for optometrists in Massachusetts 175
was also involved in an analogous antitrust dispute. The Board
enjoyed considerable power because Massachusetts law
authorized the Board to take disciplinary action against any
licensee engaged in unprofessional conduct, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation in practice or in advertising.176 Following
antitrust investigation, the FTC found that the Board restrained
competition among optometrists in Massachusetts by conspiring
with its members or others to unreasonably restrict truthful
advertising by optometrists. 177 Among other things, the Board
prohibited optometrists from (a) advertising discounts from their
usual prices and fees, (b) permitting optical establishments and
other commercial practices to truthfully advertise the
optometrists’ names or professional abilities, and (c) making use
of truthful advertising that contained testimonials or that is
“sensational” or “flamboyant”. 178 Essentially, the Board
prohibited all the above irrespective of the truth or falsity of the
advertisings.179 The Board also prevented retail optical stores
from informing the public of their lawful affiliation with an
optometrist and of the availability of the optometrist’s services. 180
In challenging the Board’s policy, the FTC found that the alleged
advertising restrictions had harmed consumers considerably. In
fact, because of these restrictions, consumers had been deprived
of the benefits of vigorous price and service competition among
171
172
173
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optometrists’ and truthful information about optometrists’
services, prices and fees. 181
At trial, the Board did not offer a procompetitive
justification for its restraints on discount advertising. 182
Essentially, the Board attempted to justify its ban on affiliation
advertising by supporting the view that its purpose was “to
reduce the risk of harm to the public from unrestrained
competition in optometry”. 183 More specifically, the Board argued
that affiliation may actually incentivize optometrists to offer
lower quality care either because “a lay person may interfere with
the optometrists’ independent professional judgment, or because
‘the commercial motivation’ of the optometrist may lessen
professional standards”. 184 In that sense, the advertising
restriction aimed to prevent consumers from falsely believing that
they are getting a good offer at a large chain store when in reality
they only received a lower price for lower quality of eye care. 185
In evaluating these claims, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) referred to Dr. Kwoka’s study that examined the
relationship between advertisement restrictions and quality. 186
Relying on the findings of this study, the ALJ noted that
“restrictions on advertising in the market for optometrist goods
and services raise prices and total cost to consumers without
affecting quality.” 187 The ALJ further observed that (a)
advertising has the effect of decreasing the cost of offering
optometric goods and services, (b) advertising optometrists offer
less thorough eye examinations than by the non-advertising ones,
and (c) in markets where advertising is permitted, 55% of the
optometrists do not advertise and a higher percentage of all
optometrists provide higher quality examinations than in markets
where advertising is banned.188 In examining the Board’s procompetition claims under the rule of reason, the ALJ alleged that
there was no proof that the banned advertising had deceived the
public and that deception “cannot justify a total ban on truthful
advertising”.189 Therefore, the Board’s alleged pro-competitive
181
182
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claims were rejected in their entirety. 190
On appeal, the FTC fully approved these findings.
However, it did so after addressing the issue of the appropriate
standard for evaluating similar restraints. The Commission
proposed that such restraints should be examined under the socalled “structured rule of reason.” 191 According to this method of
analysis, the first question to be asked about any competitive
restraint is whether it is inherently suspect. 192 If not, traditional
rule of reason applies 193, but if so, a second question must be
examined and answered: is there a plausible efficiency
justification for the restraint? If not, the restriction can easily be
found unlawful, but if a plausible efficiency justification exists,
then a third inquiry is needed: whether the proposed justification
is valid. If it is proved to be valid, a full rule of reason legal test
should apply. 194 If it is not valid then the restriction is easily
condemned under the rule of reason. 195 This structured legal test
aimed to serve as the basis for the assessment of competition
restraints in an era in which the possibility of procompetitive
restraints was not totally precluded.196 Applying its proposed
legal test and noting, once again, that defendant’s justifications
are not cognizable as they are premised on the belief that
competition itself is inappropriate in optometry, the FTC found
all the restraints imposed by the Massachusetts Board
anticompetitive. 197
190
191
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In attempting to defend the challenged regulation against
telemedicine, the Texas Medical Board, in Teladoc, also raised a
public safety defense. The Board mainly asserted that its revised
rule 198 was necessary for the protection of healthcare quality. 199 In
substantiating its claim the Board cited affidavit testimonies
presented by medical professionals explaining the limitations and
weaknesses of a telephone-only diagnosis 200 The Board claimed
these testimonies demonstrated that “there is material risk of
harm from treatment without any physical examination”. 201 The
Board also questioned Teladoc’s argument that telemedicine
improves access to patients who cannot easily reach other
healthcare providers. The Board insisted that the group of
consumers attracted to Teladoc – “a more affluent and, likely, a
more technologically savvy group - might have fewer access
needs than people living in area’s characterized by shortage of
primary care or socio-economic disadvantage.” 202 In this light it
added that “further research is needed to understand whether
Teladoc might be improving access for patients with lower
income and those in rural areas and if not, can it be positioned to
do so in the future.” 203
The Court was not convinced. Taking the view that
Teladoc submitted evidence that put into question the Board’s
claim that its regulation aimed to secure quality and insisting that
the Supreme Court has ruled that public safety concerns cannot
justify the adoption by a professional association of an anticompetitive strategy, the District Court fully dismissed the
Board’s quality claims. 204
The Board appealed the Court’s decision to a higher
court. Nonetheless, the Board dropped the appeal due to the
influx of amicus curie briefs that were filed with the court, most
of which supported Teladoc’s position. This includes a significant
brief jointly submitted by the FTC and the Department of Justice
(the Agencies). 205 In this brief, the Agencies asked the Court to
198
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ignore the Board’s appeal of Teladoc’s case by insisting that the
court doesn’t have the authority to review the decision and the
rule itself should be thrown out. 206
Interestingly, in support of Board’s appeal, the AMA and
the Texas Medical Association (the Associations) jointly filed a
brief. 207 In the brief they explained why public safety may be
harmed if the future of telemedicine was left to market forces.
The Associations acknowledged that telemedicine substantially
benefits patients, mainly by improving access to healthcare
services. 208 They clarified that telemedicine “is inappropriate for
certain medical conditions and it carries risks”. 209 They claimed
“[w]ithout the ability to conduct in person physical examinations,
treating physicians risk misdiagnosing or mistreating patients
especially through over prescription of antibiotics and other
medications”. 210 In proving their safety claims, the defendants
relied on research showing that in cases where medical
professionals cannot conduct physical examination, they may
either use a conservative approach or propose the use of
antibiotics in cases where the benefit of antibiotics therapy is
actually unclear. 211 They emphasized that in identifying both
benefits and risks, medical associations and State medical boards
across the U.S., cooperate in order to determine how the use of
telemedicine may “best serve patients and the public”.212 Since
research demonstrates that allowing the prescription of
dangerous drugs without requiring in person examination by any
medical professional may harm the quality of care, some
regulation aiming to protect public health may in fact be
necessary, doctors said. 213 Such regulation, they held, is precisely
what the Texas Medical Board undertook with the rules that
Teladoc challenged. 214 As the Board dropped the appeal,
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Med.
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206
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unfortunately, their arguments remained unexamined.

C. Protecting Quality by Correcting the Market Imperfections
Another way by which medical associations have
attempted to justify antitrust violations is by spelling out that: as
doctors they know what is best for their patients’ welfare. They
have better information regarding what quality of care means
and how it is achieved. Therefore, it is in their sphere of
responsibility to fix poorly functioning markets and protect
people’s health. The FTC and the U.S. courts have thoroughly
examined this quality argument in two seminal cases: Wilk 215 and
California Dental Association. 216
In Wilk, the legal issue centered around chiropractors’
complaints that the AMA conspired to eliminate the chiropractic
profession by refusing to cooperate with chiropractors. 217
Defendants achieved their goal, plaintiffs argued, by relying on
former Principle 3 of the AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics,
which deterred physicians “from associating professionally with
unscientific practitioners”. 218 The plaintiffs asserted that the
AMA used Principle 3 to eliminate the chiropractic profession by
characterizing them as “unscientific practitioners”. 219
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the
defendants’ strategy was a per se violation of Section 1, holding
that “a canon of medical ethics purporting, surely not frivolously,
to address the importance of scientific method gives rise to
questions of sufficient delicacy and novelty at least to escape per
se treatment.” 220 Through a rule of reason analysis the District
Court took the view that the AMA by applying former Principle
3, had unreasonably restrained trade in violation of §1 of the
Sherman Act. 221 The court found that the AMA’s main goal was
“to prevent medical physicians from referring patients to
chiropractors and from accepting referrals of patients from
chiropractors, so as to prevent chiropractors from obtaining
access to hospital diagnostic services and membership on hospital
medical staffs.” 222 The court also found that the AMA aimed “to
215
216
217
218
219
220
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prevent medical physicians from teaching at chiropractic colleges
or engaging in any joint research.” 223 In sum, AMA’s strategy
aimed to “prevent any cooperation between the two groups in the
delivery of health care services.” 224
At trial, the AMA attempted to defend its strategy on the
basis of the so-called “patient care defense.” 225 This defense
required the AMA to prove that
(a) It genuinely entertained a concern for what doctors
perceived as scientific method in the care of each person
with whom they had entered into a doctor-patient
relationship; (b) this concern was objectively reasonable;
(c) this concern had been the dominant motivating
factor in defendant’s promulgation of Principle 3 and in
the conduct intended to implement it; (d) this concern
for scientific method in patient care could not have been
adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of
competition. 226
Considering that the AMA failed to meet the defense’s
second and fourth conditions, the district court easily dismissed
this antitrust defense. 227
Although the court questioned “the AMA’s genuineness
regarding its concern for scientific method in patient care”, it
finally reached the conclusion that the AMA had established the
first factor. 228 In shaping its conclusion, the court considered that
while the AMA “was attacking chiropractic as unscientific, it
simultaneously was attacking other unscientific methods of
disease treatment (e.g., the Krebiozen treatment of cancer), and
the existence of medical standards or guidelines against
unscientific practice was relatively common.” 229
The court, however, took the view that the AMA had not
met the required burden of proof as to the second element of the
defense, “whether its concern for scientific method in patient care
was objectively reasonable.” 230 To carry out this assessment, the
court took into account substantial evidence demonstrating that
chiropractors can treat more effectively than physicians certain
223
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medical issues, such as back injuries. 231 It also noted that the
AMA’s members did not seem to examine pro-chiropractic
arguments with open mind. 232 With these elements in mind, the
court held that: there was no objectively reasonable concern that
would support a boycott of the entire chiropractic profession.” 233
It also held that the AMA had carried its burden of proof
in establishing the third element of the defense, “that its concern
about scientific method was the dominant motivating factor” in
the challenged conduct. 234 The court found that the AMA had not
met its burden of proving that “its concern for scientific method
in patient care could not have been satisfied adequately in a
manner less restrictive of competition.” 235 Since the AMA had
submitted no evidence of other policies less restrictive of
competition, such as public education, the Court found that the
AMA had not satisfied the defense’s final condition. 236
The case reached the Seventh Circuit. The Court
identified “the central question in this case was whether the
AMA’s boycott constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade
under §1 of the Sherman Act”. 237 A restraint is unreasonable “if it
falls within the category of restraints held to be per se
unreasonable, or if it violates what is known as “the rule of
reason.’” 238 Acknowledging that “the Supreme Court historically
has been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional
associations as unreasonable per se”, the court examined AMA’s
challenged boycott under the rule of reason. 239
In brief, the AMA claimed that it should be exempted
from antitrust liability under the rule of reason as Principle 3 had
pro-competitive effects. 240 The AMA essentially alleged that
healthcare markets are characterized by information asymmetries
and therefore patients may be easily deceived by “unscrupulous
health care providers”. To avoid this risk, consumers may avoid
necessary treatments. 241 In that sense, the AMA’s practice did
nothing more than protect consumers from unscientific forms of
231
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treatment. 242 The Seventh Circuit remained skeptical. Expressing
its belief that the AMA was not wholeheartedly driven by its
altruistic and scientific concerns, it rejected the defendant’s
quality justifications.243 In line with the lower court’s view, it
found AMA’s boycott anti-competitive. 244
California Dental Association v. FTC involved an
association of dentists with membership of a large percentage of
all dentists in California. 245 The antitrust issue in this case
concerned Califonria Dental Association’s (CDA) code of ethics,
including Section 10 of CDA’s professional code which
prohibited advertising or solicitation “false or misleading in any
material respect.” 246 CDA’s Judicial Council, whose role was to
enforce CDA’s Code, had issued multiple advisory opinions and
guidance elaborating upon the scope of this standard.247 These
opinions, which formed the basis of the FTC’s challenge, argued
that a statement or claim could be considered false or misleading
where:
(a) it contained a misrepresentation of fact; (b) it made
only a partial disclosure of relevant facts (c) it was likely
to create false or unjustified expectations of favorable
results and/or costs (d) it related to fees for specific types
of services without fully and specifically disclosing all
variables and (e) it contained other representations or
implications that in reasonable probability would cause
an ordinarily prudent person to be deceived. 248
Concerning price advertising, CDA allowed advertising
discounts only with extensive disclosures. 249 CDA’s Code of
Ethics and all relevant guidelines required that “all price
advertising be exact and that discount advertising list the regular
fee for each discounted service, the percentage of the discount, the
length of time that the discount will be available, verifiable fees,
and the specific groups who are eligible for the discount.” 250
When applying and enforcing these conditions, CDA often “cited
242
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members for using phrases such as low, reasonable or inexpensive
fees, and for failing to include the regular fees for each service
covered by across-the-board senior citizen discounts, or coupon
discounts for new customers”. 251
Additionally, adopting the opinion that non-price claims
“are not susceptible to measurement or verification” and therefore
“likely to be false or misleading” in practice CDA prohibited all
quality claims.252 For example, CDA recommended “denial of
membership to one dentist because her advertising included the
phrase quality dentistry which CDA thought was not susceptible
of verification”. 253 Furthermore, although written regulations had
not been adopted, CDA did not allow “claims of superiority and
the issuance of guarantees.” 254 CDA had considered an
advertisement including the phrase “we can provide the
uncompromised standards of excellence you demand’ to be “an
impermissible representation of superiority.” 255
When examining the anti-competitive effects of CDA’s
policies and norms, the FTC rejected the Massachusetts Board
analysis, finding instead that the restrictions on discount
advertising were illegal per se. 256 The FTC took the view that
CDA’s restrictions on advertising “low” or “reasonable” fees, and
its extensive disclosure requirements for discount advertising,
“effectively preclude its members from making low fee or acrossthe-board discount claims regardless of their truthfulness.” 257
Noting that the professional context of this restriction cannot
alter the analysis, as well as that in cases involving agreements
not “premised on public service or ethical norms, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly applied the per se rule,” 258 the FTC stressed
that a ban that significantly restricts price competition is illegal
per se. 259 Applying an abbreviated analysis, the FTC also
condemned the non-price advertising restrictions. With regard to
these restraints, the FTC stated, “we cannot say with equal
confidence that, as a facial matter, CDA’s concerns are unrelated
to the public service aspect of its profession, or that the practice
251
252
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facially appears to be one that would always or almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output.” 260 Considering,
however, that CDA had not provided a “convincing argument, let
alone evidence, that consumers of dental services had been, or
were likely to be, harmed by the broad categories of advertising
that it restricted”, the FTC concluded that the non-price
restrictions were clearly anticompetitive. 261
Taking the view that this case concerned a set of ethical
norms introduced by a professional organization that aimed to
prevent false and misleading advertising and that “CDA’s
policies do not, on their face, ban truthful, non-deceptive ads,”
the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of per se analysis with regards
to price advertising restrictions. 262 The court refused to accept
CDA’s procompetitive justifications that its policy encouraged
disclosure and prevented false and misleading advertising. 263
Since the record “provided no evidence that CDA’s policy has in
fact led to increased disclosure and transparency of dental
pricing[,]” such claim, the court noted, carried little weight. 264 As
to the non-price advertising restrictions, the court dismissed
CDA’s concerns that “claims about quality are inherently
unverifiable and therefore misleading.” 265 Although this danger
exists, it cannot justify preventing all quality claims and
irrespective of whether they are false or misleading. 266 In light of
these concerns, the Ninth Circuit fully aligned with the FTC’s
view that the non-price advertising restriction was nothing more
than “a naked restraint on output” and therefore no further
assessment under a rule of reason legal analysis was necessary. 267
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the judgment to the Ninth Circuit for a fuller inquiry into
whether CDA’s activities violated antitrust laws. 268 The Court
made clear that a quick look analysis should be limited only to
cases where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding
of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question
would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and
260
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markets”. 269 Considering the special facets of the professional
services market, the Supreme Court found that CDA’s practice
was not one of these cases. 270 To the Court, CDA’s restrictions
aimed to eliminate false or deceptive advertising “in a market
characterized by striking disparities between the information
available to the professional and the patient”. 271 Examining
defendant’s restrictions from this perspective, the Court
concluded that CDA’s restrictions might, instead, be procompetitive. 272 Citing Akerlof’s famous work ‘The market for
lemons, Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, the
Court stated that
in the market for professional services, in which
advertising is relatively rare and the comparability of
service packages not easily established, the difficulty for
customers or potential competitors to get and verify
information about the price and availability of services
can magnify the dangers to competition associated with
misleading advertising.273
The Court acknowledged that “the quality of professional
services tends to resist either calibration or monitoring by
individual patients or clients”. 274 This related to the expertise
required to evaluate these services and the challenge in
determining the extent to which “an outcome is attributable to the
quality of services (like a poor job of tooth-filling) or to something
else.” 275 When examining the market’s special characteristics, the
Court further recognized that “patients’ attachments to particular
professionals, the rationality of which is difficult to assess,
complicate the picture even more.” 276
The Court analyzed CDA’s price advertising restrictions,
and found that they do not necessarily limit price competition. On
the contrary, the Court held they may even enhance competition
“by reducing the occurrence of unverifiable and misleading across
the board discount advertising.” 277 Even if across the board
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discount advertisements are more effective “in drawing customers
in the short run, the recurrence of some measure of intentional or
accidental misstatement, due to the breadth of their claims, might
leak out over time to make potential clients skeptical of any such
across the board advertising, so undercutting the method’s
effectiveness.” 278 The Court explained that across the board
discount advertisements might continue to attract business
indefinitely but only because they mislead customers. 279 In this
light, their effect may be anti-competitive instead of procompetitive. 280 The Court stated that CDA’s rules reflected the
prediction “that any costs to competition associated with the
elimination of across the board advertising will be out weighted
by gains to consumer information that is exact, accurate and
more easily verifiable (at least by regulators).” 281 Although this
view may not necessarily be correct from an economics
perspective, “neither a Court nor the Commission may initially
dismiss it as presumptively wrong.” 282
As to the CDA’s non-price advertising restrictions, the
Court again abstained from adopting the lower court’s
competition analysis. The Court took the view that the Ninth
Circuit erred in dismissing the countervailing claim “that
restricting difficult to verify claims about quality or patient
comfort would have a precompetitive effect by preventing
misleading or false claims that distort the market”. 283 It
underlined that “CDA’s restrictions should be assessed
differently: as nothing more than a procompetitive ban on
puffery.” 284 Following the Supreme Court’s judgment the FTC
announced its decision not to seek further review in the Supreme
Court for this case and dismissed the complaint. 285

UNRAVELLING ARIADNE’S THREAD: HOW DO
THE U.S. ANTITRUST ENFORCERS AND THE
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DIFFERENT QUALITY PERSPECTIVES?
A. Identifying the Core of the FTC’s and the U.S. Courts’
Approach
The descriptive analysis of the above seminal cases
demonstrates that the U.S. courts and the FTC do examine
healthcare quality arguments in the context of their competition
assessment. To the FTC and the courts, quality of care matters.
However, it matters to the same extent it matters in other
industries, such as airline or automotive. Both the U.S. courts and
the FTC are straightforward with this point. With the exception
of the California Dental Association case, the central message
they constantly transmit when they deal with antitrust violations
in healthcare markets is that healthcare is not special.
I argue that there are two main implications of this
approach. First, both the FTC and the U.S. courts constantly
take the view that, as in other markets, quality will be the result
of the competitive process. Quality of care is ensured only to the
extent choice, vigorous competition and information are ensured.
Second, when the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the courts are
required to examine whether a restriction to competition and not
the maximization of the available choices is necessary for the
protection of healthcare quality, the answer is primarily no.
Convinced of the democratic and economics merits of the
competitive model, they seem unwilling to consider any claim
implying that market forces may not necessarily function
properly in this sector. 286 Consequently, when the FTC and the
U.S. courts are forced to accommodate conflicting views between
antitrust and medicine on what the main attributes of healthcare
quality are, the bottom line is that antitrust knows better. An
alternative approach was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Indiana Federation of Dentists, where the Court held that by
“preventing dentists from joining together to promote standards
of quality dental care that comport with the Indiana Dental
Code, the FTC with no expertise in the field of dentistry unwisely
regulated the dental profession.” 287 By retelling however the story
that vigorous competition and not collaboration between medical
professionals improves quality, the Supreme Court chose to
divert from the Appellate Court’s approach.
This assessment does not imply that the FTC and the U.S.
286
287
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courts completely disregard medical associations’ quality claims.
On the opposite, they do examine them. Nonetheless, they allow
these claims to enter into the equation only to the extent they
reflect the notion that healthcare markets are pervaded by
market imperfections that may diminish healthcare quality.
Indeed, the antitrust enforcers do not seem to preclude the
possibility that improving the workings of a market characterized
by market failures might make a restraint less naked. 288 This
conclusion can be easily reached taking into account the Courts’
legal analysis in two seminal antitrust cases: Wilk and California
Dental Association (CDA).
In the CDA case, Judge Souter, in delivering the opinion
of the Court, explained how the healthcare market’s special facets
may affect antitrust analysis when price and non-price
advertising restrictions are analyzed and assessed. Among other
things, Judge Souter identified (a) consumers’ challenges in
verifying price information and assessing the quality of the
services they receive; (b) the asymmetric distribution of
information between professionals and patients; (c) the patients’
attachment to particular professionals, the rationality of which is
far from easy to analyze and assess.289 As Judge Souter noted, all
these characteristics complicate the picture of the professional
services market and require antitrust enforcers to examine on the
basis of the rule of reason whether certain restrictions to
competition, such as advertising restrictions, are in fact
procompetitive, instead of anticompetitive. 290
The Court’s analysis in California Dental Association is
illuminating. To begin with, the Court’s analysis leaves no doubt
that antitrust enforcers should not shut their ears to medical
associations’ claims that healthcare markets are special.
California Dental Association has also been characterized as a
setback for what was considered “the quick look antitrust
movement”. 291 Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically claimed
that “the Court of Appeals erred when it held as a matter of law
that quick look analysis was appropriate.” 292 Nonetheless,
although the Court declared that the medical markets’ special
characteristics necessitate a more vigorous legal analysis, it
288
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missed the opportunity to clarify: (a) under what conditions the
healthcare markets’ economic and non-economic facets should be
examined under the rule of reason analysis, and (b) how antitrust
enforcers should strike the appropriate balance between
restrictions to competition and quality improvements. Not
elaborating on these issues, though, the Supreme Court inevitably
opened the door to market failure defenses much wider than it
initially aimed.
Arguably, information asymmetry will be present – albeit
in different degrees – in most cases centered around health
professionals’ activities. 293 Unfortunately, trial courts will obtain
no guidance from California Dental Association as to what extent
such information deficits may justify a rule of reason analysis or
when quick look is “meet for the case”. 294 Future litigants and
courts, not knowing just how much proof a reviewing court may
require to decide that trade under the Sherman Act was
restrained, may opt for broader, more extensive discovery and
analysis than may in fact be necessary, increasing the cost and
therefore the difficulty of successfully challenging professional
associations’ anti-competitive self-regulatory activities. 295
Surely, this is not the only weakness in the Supreme
Court’s analysis regarding the information deficits characterizing
healthcare markets. The Court’s analysis concerning the extent to
which the challenged advertising restrictions may cure this
information asymmetry has also caught the attention of the
antitrust scholarship. As noted, the Supreme Court held that
informational deficits may impair the functioning of the
healthcare market and may therefore justify professional
interventions, without explaining why and how advertising
restrictions may actually cure such deficits. Since advertising
seeks to correct market failure by increasing the amount of
information available to consumers, this, indeed, is “a critical
lapse”. 296 Relying also on the Akerlof’s article to argue that
“dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out of the
market[,]” the Court overreacted as to the extent to which
information deficits in the healthcare marketplace may diminish
quality.297 As economists argue, the lemons problem claim
completely disregards the governmental institutions aiming to
293
294
295
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protect consumers. 298 Indeed, occupational licensing or
government regulation that limits deceptive or misleading
advertising can effectively protect consumers from exploitative
advertising strategies. 299
While the Supreme Court in California Dental Association
explored why healthcare markets might differ from others, in
Wilk, the Seventh Circuit focused more on crafting a process
under the rule of reason for assessing quality claims associated
with healthcare market’s special facets. Was this attempt
successful? Considering that there are several reasons to question
the wisdom of the Seventh Circuit’s “patient care defense[,]”the
answer is not an easy one. 300
As analyzed, at issue in this case were the AMA’s ethical
norms that essentially deterred physicians from establishing any
form of cooperation with chiropractors. Such restrictions, the
AMA claimed, contributed to the protection of healthcare quality
and the advancement of scientific knowledge. 301 The Seventh
Circuit responded to this argument with the patient care defense.
Under this legal test, the defendant was required to prove that its
strategy was essentially animated by “objectively reasonable”
concern for issues related to the “scientific method” underlying
medical treatment; More importantly, the test further required
the defendant to prove that less restrictive alternatives for
protecting quality were not available. 302 This test, which
subsequently was never applied by the FTC or the courts, proved
to be demanding. 303 By reformulating the rule of reason, and, by
requiring defendants to prove both objective and subjective
elements, this test invited an open-ended inquiry into scientific
concerns and beliefs that arguably increased the level of challenge
both for judges and juries. 304 How could the defendants prove
that their concerns about chiropractic profession are based on
scientific findings considering that scientists, in general, and
doctors, in particular, constantly disagree on whether a specific
treatment is scientific? For instance, while some doctors consider
homeopathy a pseudoscience - a belief that is incorrectly
presented as scientific—others believe that this alternative form
of treatment has a positive effect on health outcomes. In addition,
298
299
300
301
302
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how can judges and antitrust enforcers assess whether the
defendants’ primary incentive in excluding competitors is the
protection of healthcare quality and not their self-interest? And if
reality clearly demonstrates that defendants’ exclusionary
strategies are animated both by their commitment to maintain
high standards of professionalism and their self-interest, how
should antitrust enforcers balance such conflicting goals and
motives? Which incentive should weigh more in their antitrust
analysis?
One would also wonder why the Court chose to introduce
a test that required defendants to prove subjective elements,
namely their dominant motives and beliefs. This is especially
striking because in antitrust cases, market characteristics and
effects, not intentions, shape the legal analysis and outcomes. As
noted in Wilk, the AMA emphasized that healthcare is burdened
with information asymmetries that may harm patients’ trust in
their doctors and that their policy did nothing more than curing
this market failure. The Court, by formulating its standard in
terms of purpose, noted it is the physicians’ intentions and
motives that became crucial 305 and not market structures and
effects.
More importantly, while the Courts seem to embrace the
possibility of integrating quality concerns into their analysis in
the context of a “market failure defense,” they essentially exclude
any possibility of integrating quality concerns into their
assessment in the context of a “public safety defense.” The FTC
and the U.S. courts continuously claim that “[t]he Sherman Act
reflects a legislative judgment that, ultimately, competition will
produce not only lower prices but also better goods and
services.” 306 Hence, adopting an alternative approach, one that
would accept that less choice and competition may be necessary
for the protection of health care quality, would amount “to
nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the
Sherman Act.” 307 The U.S. antitrust enforcers and the courts tell
the same story even when public safety claims are raised by
medical associations arguing that their challenged strategies are
in line with their ethical and moral policy to protect the public
from actions that create risks to public safety and health. Unless
their initiatives to protect quality meet the narrow conditions of
the state action doctrine, the courts confidently claim that their
See Kauper, supra note 19, at 323.
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patient safety concerns are not induced by their ethical
responsibilities to protect public safety but by mere opportunism.
Let us recall North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners where Judge Keenan clarified that “the record
supported the Board’s argument that there was a safety risk
inherent in allowing certain individuals, who are not licensed
dentists, particularly mall kiosk employees, to perform teeth
whitening services.” 308 Judge Keenan did not miss the
opportunity to admit that she was convinced that the Board’s
expelling strategy against non-dentists was mainly animated by
its commitment to “eliminate an unsafe medical practice.” 309 This
essential finding, though, did not alter the court’s antitrust
narrative. To the antitrust enforcers and the courts, “the statutory
policy precludes inquiry into the question of whether competition
is good or bad[,]” and any evaluation as to the risks to healthcare
quality the available market choices in reality create is just
unnecessary. 310

B. What are the Main Pros and Cons of the FTC’s and the U.S.
Courts’ Approach?
The above analysis revealed that the U.S. antitrust
enforcers and the courts primarily take into account quality by
ensuring that competition and choice in the healthcare services
market is not restricted. The beauty of this legal analysis lies in its
simplicity. Indeed, it offers a simple solution to a complex
problem: to ensure quality one must maximize the available
choices. It also revealed that while the U.S. antitrust enforcers
and the courts seem less unwilling to evaluate quality claims in
the context of a market failure defense, they seem clearly less
willing to assess quality concerns in the context of a public safety
defense. To them, such justifications are neither cognizable, nor
plausible. Why do the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the courts
draw such a strict line between these two types of quality
justifications? Why do they completely disregard public safety
claims? And more importantly, would the outcome of their
analysis necessarily change in case they chose to widen the range
of the quality justifications they actually consider and accept?
The answer should be negative.
In Wilk, the defendants attempted to convince the court
that the market imperfections burdening healthcare markets
308
309
310
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expelling strategy against chiropractors. In
Massachusetts Board, the optometrists argued that their anticompetitive behavior was primarily fueled by their motivation to
protect consumers from inferior eye care. In Teladoc, the Texas
Medical Board alleged that the telemedicine regulation aimed to
protect patients from inadequate diagnosis and excessive use of
antibiotics.
Although the rationale behind all these justifications
seems to differ, in fact it does not. This is because in all these
cases the alleged quality claims could be structured either as
public safety or market failure defenses. In Wilk, for instance, the
AMA could have argued that chiropractors’ treatment may lead
to inferior patient care. In Massachusetts Board, the Board,
alternatively, could have argued that consumers in eye care
services lack the adequate knowledge to evaluate the quality of
the services they receive, and thus, the challenged regulation
ensures that the imperfect market in which the Board’s members
operate becomes less imperfect. Accordingly, in Teladoc, the
Texas Medical Board could have alleged that since a medical
professional treating a patient on a telephone diagnosis only may
be called upon to act with uncertain information, the quality of
care may suffer. Therefore, their self–regulation by correcting this
market failure does nothing more than ensure that the risk is
reduced. Importantly, the antitrust enforcers and the courts
would have rejected all the above quality justifications
irrespective of the way they were structured, either as public
safety or market failure defenses. This is because none of the
alleged pro-competitive justifications would have convinced the
U.S. courts that the challenged restraints to competition were the
least restrictive ones.
Why then do the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the courts
constantly reject public safety claims? First, because if they took
patient safety justifications into account this might be translated
as a sign of distrust in the power of markets to always deliver
high quality healthcare services. It may also be seen by potential
cartelists as a sign that in healthcare markets, antitrust
enforcement is more lenient. More importantly, it may be seen by
antitrust infringers in other markets as a sign that quality justifies
restrictions to competition. Therefore, deterrence may be
weakened. Furthermore, if public safety was considered a
plausible and cognizable justification, both judges and agencies
may be more tempted to shape their decisions in line with their
political preferences and ideologies. If courts and the FTC
integrated public safety claims in their analysis one additional
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risk might emerge: medical associations may be more incentivized
to raise safety claims that mask their self-interest. Additionally,
accepting patient safety claims as plausible justifications might
erode price competition and lead to price increases. In light of
these risks, their narrow approach ensures accountability,
transparency and enhances price competition.
What are the cons of this approach? Insisting that the
competitive process will ultimately protect healthcare quality
does not necessarily reflect market reality. Arguably, the claim
that more choice necessarily brings better outcomes sounds more
like a textbook myth rather than a sound economic principle.
This is because this simple heuristic claim is based on the
erroneous presumption that human beings do a remarkably good
job in making choices or at least a better job than anyone else. 311
Nonetheless, behavioral economics warn that the ways human
being act do not always and necessarily reflect the predictions of
rational choice theory. 312
Humans predictably make mistakes. 313 For instance,
although medical research indicates that obesity is linked with an
increased risk for heart disease and diabetes, frequently causing
premature death, obesity rates in the United States approximate
20% and more than 60% of Americans are considered either
obese or overweight. 314 Certainly, this example neither suggests
nor indicates that humans repeatedly fail to make good choices.
On the opposite, people choose well “in contexts in which they
have experience, good information and prompt feedback, such as
when choosing ice cream flavors.” 315 They do less well though in
cases in which they lack either experience or good information. 316
Why?
People generally tend to make biased assessments of risks.
They estimate frequencies or probabilities by asking “how readily
examples come to mind.” 317 Inevitably, these biased assessments
of risk adversely affect people’s decision-making process and
their ability to construct rational choices. As Professors Thaler
and Sunstein observe, “easily remembered events may inflate
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008).
312
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people’s probability judgements; and if not such events come to
mind, their judgements of likelihoods might be distorted
downwards.” 318 Humans are also unrealistically optimistic when
they exercise choice. 319 As they often underestimate the possibility
of being harmed, they may even decide not to take the necessary
preventive measures. 320 People also suffer from loss aversion
which is a form of cognitive nudge.321 This may deter humans
from making changes even when such changes align with their
interests. 322
Additionally, although generally people appreciate choice,
“the tendency to search long and hard reduces enjoyment from
the end result.” 323 This is because not all people have the ability to
adequately assess any type of information. Some people even fail
to assess fairly simple information. 324 In one study, participants
were presented with decision tasks that mainly involved locating
information in tables and graphs.325 Surprisingly, the youngest
participants’, aged 18-35, errors averaged 8% while the oldest
ones’, aged 85-94, averaged 40% errors. 326
These challenges are magnified especially when people
have to predict how their choices will affect their lives.327 This is
because of the ambiguity aversion people exhibit, a notion
implying that people prefer to make choices in contexts where
they can more easily predict the outcome rather than in contexts
in which the end results are much more ambiguous.328 Thus,
when humans cannot easily translate the choices they make into
the experiences they may have, they may benefit less from
numerous choices or from choosing not to choose for
themselves. 329 In these situations, increasing the amount of
information available to consumers can overwhelm cognitive
abilities and inevitably lead to choices that do not serve
318
319
320
321
322
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consumers’ interests. 330
Surely, one could argue that choosing a doctor, hospital, or
treatment is a complicated task since the amount of information a
patient should actually evaluate in order to make the choice that
best serves her interests is usually high. For example, choosing
the appropriate medical treatment involves assessing the
probabilities of benefit or harm from alternative forms of
treatment or no treatment at all. And, as noted, experimental
evidence reveals that individuals face difficulties in making good
and rational decisions when they are required to weigh
probabilities. Therefore, to the extent product or service
characteristics increase in complexity, consumers in general (and
patients in particular) may be unwilling to invest extensive time
and energy into assessing all the available choices, comparing
various levels of prices and quality, and choosing the product or
service that better meets their needs. 331
Research in behavioral economics further indicates that
individuals also lack the ability to construct the right choices
when they are particularly influenced by fears of regret from a
decision. 332 This is because consumers may often overestimate the
probability of an adverse outcome simply because they are afraid
that they might regret this decision.333 Therefore, patients that are
empowered to make autonomous decisions may anticipate greater
risk from treatment options compared to those whose doctors
chose for them. 334 Indeed, when consumers make more
autonomous decisions, they tend to opt for more conservative
treatment options. 335
Patients’ choices regarding medical treatment may not
necessarily improve their welfare for one additional reason:
because they are often socially constructed. 336 This means that
when patients face complex health decisions, they often prefer
relying on their intuition and emotions as well as trusted
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networks, rather than on objective, reliable information. 337 When
such biases, norms, and heuristics are at stake, there are two
important implications for antitrust enforcers and policy makers:
individuals will tend to make judgment errors, and act in ways
that do not necessarily reflect the presumptions of expected utility
theory. 338
Moreover, arguing that vigorous competition will
necessarily improve quality completely disregards medicine’s
perceptive on how patients’ lives are actually improved. As
medical professionals spell out, quality of medical treatment also
depends on non-economic values such as the notions of
acceptability and trust, essential features of the patient-doctor
relationship and the therapeutic enterprise. Indeed, the notion of
trust is crucial in the case of medical treatment, where the stakes
are as dear as life itself. 339 Patients that trust their physicians are
more likely to seek care in a timely manner, share sensitive
information and conform to their physicians’ advice. 340 All of
these are extremely important determinants in health outcomes.
How would the U.S. antitrust enforcers and courts reply to
this critique? Considering how they apply the state action
doctrine, a plausible answer might be that to the extent regulation
exists that exempts a specific activity from the application of
antitrust, and this activity is actively supervised by the state, the
appropriate balance is actually reached between the pursuit of
healthcare quality and vigorous antitrust. If such regulation exists
and if the conditions of the state action doctrine apply, this
answer is convincing. If, however, such a regulation does not
exist and if state Boards give good reasons why specific practices
create serious risks to healthcare quality and threaten public
safety, this answer is inadequate. Faithful to the belief that
markets always ensure quality and that public health and safety
justifications are extraneous to antitrust analysis, the U.S. courts
and the FTC would reject such justifications even if reality
showed that patients’ safety is at risk and therefore medical
professionals’ intervention seems necessary.
Arguably, this approach suffers from important
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drawbacks. Essentially, it disregards the fact that unregulated
medical markets are pervaded by negative externalities. In this
light, an individual might decide to receive a low-quality
treatment rather than no service at all because she does not fully
internalize the cost of poor service. When, however, poorlyinformed consumers receive poor care, the effects fall beyond
those who receive medical treatment. As physicians stressed in
Teladoc, “[r]epercussions of poor care are felt from emergency
rooms and inner-city clinics to schools and the workplace – not to
mention on government agencies that may themselves have to
pay for the bad outcomes.” 341 The FTC and the U.S. courts by
limiting their analysis to the impact of a specific competition
restriction on the variety of choices consumers in fact enjoy, they
forget to consider the costs to the overall society these choices
actually create. Consequently, they end up disregarding that a
restriction to competition may avoid more deadweight loss than it
actually creates.
Moreover, an antitrust policy that relies on the notion that
more choice necessarily improves healthcare outcomes without
examining the risks to healthcare quality these choices may in
reality create, runs the risk of applying in a way that contributes
to the health disparities between the rich and the poor. Absent
effective regulation protecting healthcare quality, while the poor
or the uninsured would end up buying the low cost, low-quality
or even unsafe services offered by low skilled unqualified
providers, the rich would buy the more expensive and higher
quality services offered by high skilled qualified providers.
Surely, the application of antitrust law in the healthcare sector
should not aim to reduce the health inequalities between different
social groups. Nonetheless, this does not imply that its application
in healthcare markets should also widen them.
Potential risks to healthcare quality may also disincentive
consumers from enjoying a specific good or service. This risk is
not an imaginary one, as North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners clearly demonstrates. In this case, Judge Keenan
illustrated in her separate statement, that the Board was aware
that several consumers had received teeth whitening services that
did not even respect the minimum standards of hygiene.
Inevitably, some consumers were harmed. Because consumers
cannot easily assess medical professional’s qualifications or
341
Brief of American Medical Association and Texas Medical Association
as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellants at 29, Teladoc, Inc. v.
Texas Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 16-50017).

2019

Connecting the Dots

221

medical treatment’ adequacy and effectiveness, they might not be
able to fully understand and identify the reason why they
suffered a specific harm. Therefore, they might decide to stop
receiving teeth whitening services both from dentists and nondentists. Ultimately, non-licensed or incompetent professionals
would harm the reputation of licensed and high qualified
professionals. Arguably, this is another form of negative
externality the FTC’s and the U.S. courts’ analysis clearly
ignores.
Additionally, the courts’ and the FTC’s approach with
regards to health safety claims may lead to contradictions and
considerable confusion taking into account the Supreme Court’s
antitrust analysis in North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners. As discussed, in this case the Board alleged that
permitting non-dentists to perform teeth whitening creates risks
to healthcare quality. The FTC rejected this quality concern on
the basis that such a justification is not a cognizable one, which
means one that stems from measures that increase output,
improve product quality or innovation. Nonetheless, this strict
view may lead to contradictory outcomes for the following
reason: one important aspect of product’s or service’s quality is
safety. In this regard, a competition restrain that may enhance a
product’s or service’s safety would also improve its quality.
However, since public safety justifications are not considered
cognizable, they would be rejected by the FTC and the U.S.
courts, as extraneous to an antitrust analysis.
Moreover, an antitrust analysis that clearly disregards
medical professionals’ views on what health care quality is and
how it is achieved disregards that medicine “is not only a business
but also a calling.” 342 Doctors’ motivation to protect quality does
not always and necessarily stem from their self-interest, but also
by their commitment to altruism, excellence, and public service
ethos. By considering, however, only economic incentives and by
disregarding the benefit to the public which occurs from the
promotion of scientific medicine and the protection of
professionalism, the FTC and the U.S. courts end up adopting an
analysis that is one-dimensional.343
342
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From health policy perspective though, improvements to
healthcare quality cannot be achieved if not all functions of a
health system commit to the quality goals the health system as a
whole pursues. As Avedis Donabedian, the father of research in
healthcare quality, insists, “the commitment to quality should
pervade an institution at all its levels and in all its aspects.” 344
Arguably, medical professionals and antitrust enforcers are
responsible for protecting quality in different ways. While
antitrust enforcers aim to promote quality by protecting
competition, healthcare providers promote quality by ensuring
that the services they provide meet the highest possible standard
of care. 345 Nonetheless, to them, this goal is better achieved
through professionalism and less through vigorous competition.
Since, however, doctors’ commitment to protect quality is highly
linked with their commitment to professionalism, a health care
system as well as an antitrust policy that aims to protect quality
as a whole should not disregard this essential dimension of the
notion. An antitrust policy that sees doctors mainly as knaves,
“individuals that are predominantly motivated by self-interest[,]”
and not as knights,346 “professionals that are predominantly
public-spirited[,]”
might
seriously
undermine
medical
professionals’ commitment to professionalism and therefore their
commitment to protect healthcare quality.
What are the alternatives? The U.S. antitrust enforcers
and the courts should extend the notion of quality when they
apply antitrust law in healthcare. In fact, they should adopt a
definition that echoes the perspectives of both medicine and
antitrust law; a definition that in fact takes into account that the
notion of healthcare quality is a multidimensional concept that
encompasses the goals of safety, acceptability, effectiveness and
trust in the doctor-patient relationship. This definition would be
in line with the definition that has been adopted by key players in
the field of healthcare such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Health Organization, the
Institute of Medicine, and Avedis Donabedian.347
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Would the adoption of this wider definition of healthcare
quality transform the application of antitrust law in healthcare?
Surely, the answer is positive. Adopting a wider notion of
healthcare quality would allow the FTC and the courts to create
an analytical framework under which conflicting goals between
antitrust and medicine could in fact be balanced. This is because
if the U.S. antitrust enforcers adopted a more holistic approach
when they examine how a specific restriction to competition may
impact healthcare quality, they would be able to balance different
components of quality against harm to competition. They would
be able, for example, to balance safety and effectiveness verses
choice and competition, acceptability and trust verses choice and
competition. As Professor Allensworth has observed, “the U.S.
courts have avoided developing a framework for when
competition may suppress rivalry for the sake of a more
functional market.” 348 Since the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the
courts have chosen to define quality as choice, any balancing
exercise between harm to competition and the multiple facets of
healthcare quality has become simply unnecessary. Widening,
however, the values and the dimensions of quality that shape
their legal analysis and outcomes, would incentivize them to
provide more accurate guidance on whether and how
improvements to quality may outweigh harms to competition.
Undoubtedly, if the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the
Courts balanced potential harm to competition against the
protection of quality, the costs of antitrust enforcement may be
increased. Nonetheless, if antitrust authorities adopted the
proposed solution, an important goal would be achieved: they
would apply an antitrust analysis that does not ignore healthcare
markets’ limits, imperfections, and special facets. They would
also apply an antitrust analysis that is in line with behavioral
economics research indicating that human beings in general and
patients in particular do not necessarily and always make the
decisions that serve their interests. In other words, they would
apply an analysis that reflects more healthcare markets realities
and less textbook myths. They would also apply antitrust law in
the healthcare sector in a way that does not disregard the
perspective of medicine on what healthcare quality is and how it
is achieved. Indeed, adopting this holistic approach would allow
effectiveness, efficacy, efficiency, acceptability (or else the notion of trust in the
doctor-patient relationship), optimality, equity, legitimacy).
348
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different institutions pursuing different goals to respect each
other’s views and perspectives on what healthcare quality is and
how it is achieved.

CONCLUSION
This article has identified how the FTC and the U.S.
courts define and assess healthcare quality and how they respond
to medical associations’ claims that a certain restriction of
competition is necessary for the protection of healthcare quality.
In concluding, this article does not aim to claim that the U.S.
antitrust enforcers and the courts should evaluate healthcare
quality defenses and justifications in a more lenient way.
Undoubtedly, a more lenient approach may incentivize medical
associations to raise quality concerns that may disguise selfinterest. More importantly, it may substantially suppress price
competition and prohibit citizens from enjoying healthcare
services that are essential for their well-being and flourishing. It
has argued, though, that the U.S. antitrust enforcers and the
courts should adopt a definition of quality that reflects the notion
that healthcare quality is a multidimensional concept consisting
of the notions of effectiveness, safety, trust and acceptability.
Adopting this wider definition would incentivize the antitrust
enforcers to create an analytical framework under which they
would be able to balance harm to competition against the
multiple facets of healthcare quality. Adopting a wider more
holistic approach to healthcare quality would also allow the U.S.
antitrust enforcers and the courts to adopt an analysis that
reflects healthcare markets’ limits and special facets. Expanding
their approach would also ensure that antitrust enforcers and
medical associations do not constantly struggle to impose their
own views on what the prevailing facets of healthcare quality
should be. In Donabedian’s language, an alternative approach
would ensure that all functions of the health system commit to
the quality goals the system as a whole pursues.

